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HOW REPRESENTATIVE ARE REFERENDUMS?
EVIDENCE FROM 20 YEARS OF SWISS REFERENDUMS
Arndt Leininger1 Lea Heyne2
Abstract
Direct democracy allows citizens to reverse decisions made by legislatures and
even initiate new laws which parliaments are unwilling to pass, thereby, as its
proponents  argue,  leading  to  more  representative  policies  than  would  have
obtained under a purely representative democracy. Yet, turnout in referendums is
usually lower than in parliamentary elections and tends to be skewed towards
citizens  of  high  socio-economic  status.  Consequently,  critics  of  direct
democracy argue that  referendum outcomes may not be representative of the
preferences of the population at large. We test this assertion using a compilation
of  post-referendum surveys  encompassing  148  national  referendums  held  in
Switzerland between 1981 and 1999. Uniquely, these surveys also asked non-
voters  about  their  opinion  on  the  referendum’s  subject.  Comparing  opinion
majorities  in  the  surveys  against  actual  referendum outcomes  we  show that
representativeness increases slightly in turnout as well as over time. However,
we find only few cases where the outcome would have been more representative
even under full turnout vis-a vis a counterfactual representative outcome. Thus,
our results are in line with research on the turnout effect in elections: Higher
turnout would not radically change the outcome of votes. On balance we find
more  cases  where  referendums  provided  more  representative  outcomes  than
cases  where  the  outcome  was  unrepresentative  vis-a-vis  representative
democracy.  Hence,  we  conclude  that,  overall,  direct  democracy  seems  to
improve representation in Switzerland. 
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1 Introduction
Proponents of direct democracy claim that it delivers more representative policy outcomes than a purely
representative democracy. After all, referendums allow citizens to reverse decisions made by legislatures and
even initiate new laws that legislatures are unwilling to pass, and to bring topics on the political agenda that
would otherwise not have been dealt with. However, critics claim precisely the opposite: They argue that,
firstly, turnout in referendums tend to be lower than in elections and, secondly, that voters and non-voters
have different preferences. Hence, referendums should lead to more unrepresentative policies.
Overall, referendums can generate strong beliefs in the legitimacy of decisions taken through this procedure
(Esaiasson,  Gilljam,  and  Persson  2012)  but  the  legitimacy  of  that  procedure  is  also  dependent  on
participation  therein,  not  least  because  turnout  can  potentially  influence  the  outcome  of  popular  votes.
Hence, whether low and skewed turnout in referendums leads to unrepresentative outcomes is an important
question regarding the normative desirability of direct democracy. 
In this paper we directly test for the effect of turnout on the representativeness of referendums, using the
unique example of Switzerland, the country with the most established and long-lasting tradition of direct
democracy as a complement of representative democracy. Concretely, we compare the actual results of Swiss
national referendums against the majority  opinion among the population estimated from post-referendum
surveys as well  as the  policy which would have been passed in absence of the referendum – the latter
represented by the national parliament’s vote on the referendum issue. We focus on Switzerland because
referendums  are  frequently  held  and  there  is  great  variation  in  turnout.  The  focus  on  Swiss  national
referendums also follows a very practical consideration. All national level referendums in Switzerland are
routinely covered by post-referendum surveys. The so-called ‘Vox’ surveys have a unique feature which we
exploit: self-reported non-voters are also asked how they would have voted if they had turned out to vote.
Hence, we are able to compare the aggregated answers of both voters and non-voters combined against the
actual referendum outcome.
We test whether higher turnout generally leads to more representative results. Our results confirm that the
representativeness of opinions expressed at the ballot increases in turnout. However, that correlation is very
small. In most cases even under full turnout the result would not change. If high turnout matters, then it
should matter more for the perceived legitimacy rather than the outcome of a vote.
In the following, we first present the case of turnout in Switzerland before we assess the literature on the
links between turnout and representativeness. Next, we present the VoxIt data we use, where we present a
descriptive assessment of the representativeness of Swiss national referendums, before proceeding to our
correlational analysis. Lastly, we discuss the results and implications for future research.
2 Why Turnout matters
2.1. Turnout in Swiss referendums
For the Swiss national referendums which we study, the argument that direct democracy sees lower turnout
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than representative democracy seems to hold. Mean turnout in our sample of referendums held between 1981
and 1999  is indeed (slightly) lower (40.8%) than mean turnout in the five national elections held within the
same period (45.8%) – see Figure 1. Most, that is 112 out of 148, referendums saw lower turnout than the
respective preceding national  election.  Research on elections  provides evidence that  turnout  tends to be
skewed towards citizens of high socio-economic status (Armingeon and Schädel 2015; Nevitte et al. 2009;
Lijphart 1997). If this extends to referendums and leads to differences in opinion between voters and non-
voters we should expect a relationship between turnout and the representativeness of referendum votes. 
However,  research  in  Switzerland  shows  that  only  less  than  a  fifth  of  the  population  never  votes  in
referendums, whereas around two thirds of citizens vote selectively and the rest always votes (Sciarini et al.
2016; Marques de Bastos 1993). Again, this raises the question if and how often referendum results are
unrepresentative of the population at large. Furthermore, turnout in Swiss referendums is also subject to high
fluctuation,  ranging  from  30%  to  80%.  Recent  research  suggests  that  changes  in  turnout  can  have  a
significant impact on electoral (Artés 2014; Finseraas and Vernby 2014) as well as referendum outcomes
(Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2015), but with inconsistent results as to who profits. While some studies
do provide evidence that higher turnout benefits the left through the additional mobilization of less well-off
voters, the estimated effects are mostly small, too small to change who wins (Hansford and Gomez 2010;
Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003). While some may view these findings to provide indirect evidence that
representation is improved through higher turnout they do not constitute a direct test.  
2.2. Why turnout matters for representation
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Figure 1: Turnout in Swiss national referendums and elections (1981-1999)
Much of the research on turnout is explicitly or implicitly motivated by Tingsten's law of dispersion which
states  that  lower  turnout  leads  to  more  socioeconomically  biased  electorates  (Tingsten  1937).  Most
established democracies have experienced a secular decline in turnout in the past decades (Hooghe and Kern
2016; Gray and Caul 2000).  Not surprisingly then, turnout, at the individual as well as the aggregate level,
has been and continues to be one of the largest literatures in research in political science (Blais 2006; Geys
2006). The negative consequences of low turnout have been most famously formulated by Lijphart (1997):
“Low voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased turnout.” Lijphart argues that differences
between voters and non-voters in terms of a number of socio-economic, demographic and attitudinal factors
translate into worse representation of these citizens because they are under-represented in the electorate.
Invoking Tingsten's law of dispersion he claims that the representation of less well to do voters worsens
when turnout declines.
Social inequality in turnout is well documented. Beginning with Gosnell (1927) a large number of studies
have shown that citizens with low income, less education, the young and also ethnic minorities display a
lower propensity to vote (Armingeon and Schädel 2015; Leighley and Nagler 2013; Nevitte et al. 2009; Filer,
Kenny, and Morton 1993; Filer, Kenny, and Morton 1991). It is also well know that where the classic left-
right dimension is salient lower socioeconomic strate of the population lean more towards the left. Tingsten
(1937) himself, in an analysis of Swedish elections, showed that poorer areas voted more for the socialists. A
finding which has been corroborated for many other democracies, both on aggregate and individual level
data (see for instance Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948, chap. 3; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee
1954, chap. 4; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, chap. 12; Clarke 1996, 40–45). Further, citizens of low income favor
more redistribution (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005).  
In this line of reasoning low, and biased, turnout implies a wealthier median voter who would move electoral
outcomes and consequently policy to the right. To the extent that public policy systematically benefits voters
over nonvoters, these problems should be even more acute in referendums as turnout is usually lower than in
elections. For instance, Linder (2010, 95f) contends that, “especially when participation is low, the choir of
Swiss  direct  democracy  sings  in  upper  or  middle-class  tones.”  We translate  this  expectation  into  the
following hypothesis:
The higher turnout in a referendum vote the more representative will its outcome be. 
However, based on the literature we do not have very strong expectations for this relationship to hold. There
is no evidence that the left consistently profits from high turnout. If such correlations obtain, as they do in
some cases, they are usually weak, too weak to alter who wins in most cases. In their summary of research
on the topic Sinnott et al. (2017) suggest that where common sense expectations go wrong is in the implicit
assumption  that  working  class  non-voters  if  made  to  vote  will  behave  like  working  class  voters.  They
conclude that if Tingsten's law of dispersion holds at all it does so for age not income.
This is in line with much of prior research. A classic study by DeNardo (1980) finds no relationship between
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turnout and the results for the democratic candidate in US presidential elections. Rather, DeNardo shows that
the incumbent party candidate tends to suffer from increases in turnout. Using individual level data Citrin
(2003) and Brunell  (2004) simulate results for US senate races and US presidential elections under full
turnout. While they find slight gains for Democrats under full turnout, in most cases these change would not
be enough to alter the election outcome. This is consistent with more recent results by Leighley and Nagler
(2013, chap. 2) who based on the large samples of the Current Population Survey find that the income and
education bias is unaffected by turnout levels. 
More  recently,  more  and  more  studies  with  an  explicit  identification  strategy  have  sought  to  exploit
exogenous shocks to turnout to reliably test for causal effects of turnout. They do find such an effect but
produce inconsistent results. For instance two papers both using rainfall as an instrument for turnout, find
that in one case US democrats profit from higher  turnout (Hansford and Gomez 2010) and in the other case
small other parties rather than the main left party in Spain profit (Artés 2014). 
Finseraars and Vernby (2014) exploit an institutional reform in Norway as shock to turnout and find that the
mainstream left party sees its vote share increase but so do radical right parties. Fowler (2015) finds turnout
increases  due  to  random overlap  between  US  gubernatorial  and  congressional  elections  to  benefit  the
Democrats, with great variance in effect sizes. As most studies report rather small effects of turnout variation
on electoral outcomes, studies documenting large shifts in electoral and policy outcomes (Fowler 2013) are
the exception to the rule. 
Most of the evidence cited so far harkens back to the US. Yet, in Europe research has also been mostly
unsupportive of Tingsten’s Law as it concerns class. Of course, some papers such as Pacek and Radcliff's
(1995) study of turnout and electoral outcomes in 19 states between 1950 to 1990 which Lijphart (1997, 5)
cites  as  “the  most  persuasive  evidence”  find  a  relationship  between  turnout  and  left  party’s  success.
However,  this  paper's  results,  as  Fisher  (2007)  convincingly  demonstrates,  do  not  hold  up  when
methodological shortcomings are corrected. Summarizing a great number of studies from European countries
Lutz and Marsh (2007,  545) conclude that  “[t]here is  no significant  bias against  the left  that  would be
redressed if only turnout were higher.”
While the literature on elections is large but inconclusive, we know even less about referendums because of a
dearth of similar  papers on referendums.  We know of only three studies which have looked at  the link
between turnout and referendum outcomes. Early work by Di Giacomo (1993) who studies 60 referendums
conducted during the 1980s shows that  in 13 referendums the majority of non-voters would have voted
differently from how the majority of voters voted. Of these 13 referendums six would have had a different
outcome if all non-voters had participated – 10% of all the referendums in this period. Lutz (2007) analyses
VoxIt surveys for 144 Swiss referendums separately correlating respondents' vote choice – or hypothetical
vote choice for abstainers – with their reported participation. Significant correlations obtain in only half of
the referendums. He then predicts how the proportion of yes-votes would have looked under full turnout,
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concluding that in half of the referendums full turnout would have changed the share of yes-votes by 5-10%,
and by less in the other half. Most recently, Bechtel et al. (2015) exploiting the introduction of compulsory
voting in the Swiss canton Vaud in 1925 find that close to universal turnout caused by compulsory voting
strengthened electoral support for leftist policy positions by 20 percentage points. They find a similar but
weaker pattern for instances of direct legislation in Swiss cantons between 1908 and 1970. 
While these results demonstrate that turnout can have an impact on the result of a referendum, they do not
address the representativeness of that outcome. We seek to contribute to the literature by broadening the view
to referendums and putting a focus on representation directly.
3 The data and what they tell us about the representativeness 
of referendums
3.1. The data
Here, we describe the data used in this paper – cumulated surveys from the Swiss ‘Vox’ surveys carried out
after each national referendum since 1977 (data available for referendums from 1981 on) – and provide
descriptive results on the representativeness of the referendums covered by the data.3 The ‘Vox’ surveys were
unique in asking all respondents, also non-voters, for their vote choice which in the case of non-voters is
obviously hypothetical: “If you would have gone voting, which would have been your decision on...”4 With
this data, we are able to estimate the distribution of opinions on a referendum vote for the whole population. 
This approach is similar to studies on the effect of direct democracy on representation in US states. These
studies test whether policy – on abortion (Gerber 1996), on fiscal and tax issues (Matsusaka 2004) as well as
range of mostly social issues (Matsusaka 2010; Lax and Phillips 2012) – is more likely to match survey-
based estimates of majority opinion among citizens in states with direct democracy, even if no referendum
was held on the issue. We use them same approach to obtain estimates of citizens’ opinion on the issues at
stake. Beginning with the year 2000, the ‘Vox’ surveys have unfortunately dropped the question asking non-
voters how they would have voted had they participated. Still, this leaves us with a considerable number of
referendums of all types: 50 initiatives, 43 referendums, 46 obligatory referendums and 9 counter-initiatives. 
Switzerland has a long tradition of direct democracy dating back to the 19th century. Citizens vote on four
dates per year with often more than one proposal on the ballot on a single day. Citizens themselves can
initiate votes through the initiative for a partial revision of the constitution, which requires the collection of
100,000 signatures. The government may submit a counter-initiative to an initiative. Moreover, citizens can
submit  a  recently  passed  law  to  a  referendum by collecting  50,000  signatures.  Referendums  are  also
obligatory on constitutional changes and international treaties. 
3 We use a cumulation of ‘Vox’ surveys provided by FORS under the title ‘VoxIt.’
4 In German: “Wenn Sie an die Urne gegangen wären...wie hätten Sie da abgestimmt, welches wäre Ihre Stellungnahme
gewesen zur...”. The survey question does, however, not restate the complete question and wording of the actual 
referendum in question, but just the title of the initiative, such as “Revision of the unemployment insurance” (in 
German: “Revision der Arbeitslosenversicherung”). Voters are simply asked how they actually voted.
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For each of the 148 referendums we aggregate the individual-level data to obtain an estimate of the share of
yes-votes among the population. We then compare our survey-based estimates against the actual outcomes of
the  referendum  votes  to  produce  the  dependent  variables  for  our  analysis.  Before  we  specify  the
operationalization of these variables in greater detail, we describe a number of challenges that the data pose
us and how we deal with them.
One problem with the surveys is that voters are over-represented and turnout is over-reported. Voters are
more likely to participate in surveys and some non-voters are prone to lie about their participation due to the
social desirability of turnout. Also, response rates in the Vox surveys which tend to correlate with turnout are
low. Both turnout and response rates in Switzerland are low in international comparisons. Turnout estimated
from the sample is on average 16.5 %-points higher than actual turnout.5 We calculate weights to give less
weight to self-reported voters and more weight to self-reported abstainers so that once we aggregate the data
using weights we obtain the same turnout rates that have actually been reported (cf. Figure 2). We apply
these weights when aggregating yes-shares for the population so that voters are not overrepresented in our
aggregates.6 There is  little evidence that estimates of opinions for voters are biased by overreporting or
improved through applying demographic weights (Funk 2016). 
5 For further summary statistics on overreporting of turnout see the appendix, Figure 1 and Table 1.
6 We also use these weights because we lack consistent provision of weights for the Vox surveys.
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Figure 2: Reported against actual turnout before and after weighting. The dashed 45 degree line 
indicates a perfect fit between actual and reported turnout. Points above the dashed line indicate 
overreporting of turnout.
We can assess the accuracy of our estimates of turnout and adjust for discrepancies, but obviously we cannot
check the validity of our estimates of majority opinion among non-voters and the population directly, as there
is no benchmark to compare them to. What we can do, however, is look at survey-based estimates of opinion
among self-reported voters. We do have a benchmark for this group: the actual referendum outcome. 
Figure 3 (left panel) shows that actual and reported yes shares are similarly distributed, although the reported
yes-shares  in  the  survey show a dip around 50 percent  indicating a  band-wagoning effect.  The ‘VoxIt’
surveys are conducted after a referendum so some respondents state having voted for the winning option
despite having voted differently or not at all. Consequently, we see less close results in the survey data than
actually occurred. Both distributions are fairly similar when it  comes to means, standard deviations and
confidence intervals.7 If reported yes shares were perfectly equal to actual yes-shares we would expect all
points to be on the 45 degree line. Most points are reasonably close to it (cf. Fig. 3, right panel). The average
difference  between  actual  and  reported  yes-shares  is  just  4.8%-points.  Obviously,  there  need  not  be  a
connection between the accuracy of estimates of voters’ opinions and the accuracy of estimates of non-
voters’ opinion. However, we are more confident about the quality of the data than we were if estimates of
voters’ opinions were very inaccurate. 
Another caveat is the fact that self-reported non-voters have not been asked about their hypothetical vote
7 See also tables 2 to 4 in the appendix.
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Figure 3: Reported against actual turnout before and after weighting. The dashed 45 degree line indicates a perfect fit 
between actual and reported turnout. Points above the dashed line indicate overreporting of turnout.
Figure 4: Left panel: Number, turnout, and yes shares in Swiss referendums on a yearly basis, 1981-2014. Right panel: 
Types of Swiss referendums per year, 1981-2014. The vertical dashed line indicates where our sample of referendums 
ends.
choice  anymore  since  1999.  Can  we  assume  that  our  results  are  representative  of  later  and  future
referendums? When we look at Swiss referendums since 2000 and compare them to those of the period
covered by our data, we find that the characteristics of referendums have not changed substantially since
then.  The number of referendums per year  is  similar  from the 1980s to today. More importantly, mean
turnout and yes-shares do not change significantly after 2000 (Figure 4, left panel), the same is true for the
types of referendums (Figure 4, right  panel).  While it  would be preferable to have data on more recent
referendums, these comparisons at least do not give us strong reasons to believe that our analysis should not
be broadly representative of more recent referendums. 
Lastly, we need to clarify how we treat a third group of respondents: those who do not voice an opinion on
an issue. The problem of non-opinions seems particular pertinent in referendums as voting behavior is more
volatile than in elections (Leduc 2002). We aggregate yes-shares only among respondents who voice an
opinion, ignoring respondents without an opinion. If we were to calculate yes-shares within the full sample,
including missings on the vote choice variable, our estimates would be considerably lower and, we believe,
inaccurate. From a normative point of view we treat respondents who lack an opinion as being indifferent
between ‘yes’ and ‘no’. There are many reasons why citizens have no opinion on an issue. One important
reason is that they do not care enough about the issue to inform themselves. Finally, note that we simply
mirror the same procedure which is used in referendums and elections, too. Here, vote shares are calculated
within  the  set  of  cast  votes  –  non-voters  are  ignored  and,  additionally,  invalid  and  blank  ballots  are
disregarded. On average 23.5% percent of respondents voice no opinion on a ballot proposition. Because we
have assigned a weight of zero to respondents not holding an opinion, one may wonder whether we should
give less weight to non-voters than to voters when we aggregate across the full sample. Surely, at least some
non-voters have weaker preferences than voters, which is why they abstained in the first place. This may
well be, but we lack a measure of intensity of preferences. In the absence of a convincing measure, we thus
decide to stick to a ‘democratic default’ of weighing all opinionated citizens equally. 
Having discussed the quality of our data we turn towards a description of the operationalization of our
dependent variables. To obtain a quantitative indicator of representation we calculate the differences between
actual and reported yes-shares. We also code a qualitative indicator of representation by checking whether
opinion majorities in the sample and among actual voters are on opposite sides of 50%. In the next section,
we conduct further comparisons to arrive at a total of four indicators of representation.
3.2 How representative are Swiss national referendums?
First, we classify a referendum as a mismatch if a minority in the survey said ‘no’ but a majority of actual
voters said ‘yes’, or vice-versa. This way we simply check for divergences in opinions. However, Swiss
direct democracy contains an institutional safeguard. The so called  Ständemehr requires that for a popular
initiative  or  obligatory  referendum to  pass  a  majority  of  cantons,  in  addition  to  a  majority  of  voters
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nationwide (Volksmehr), must vote yes.8 This gives more weight to more rural and conservative over urban
and progressive cantons. For example, a 2013 referendum on improving child care facilities and facilitating
the return of women to the labor market was accepted by 54.3% of the population, but rejected by a majority
of 13 cantons, notably the rural and conservative ones. According to critics, the Ständemehr should thus not
really improve representation but rather reinforce the bias that critics of the process expect from referendums
in general pro-conservative, pro-rural.9 
Furthermore, even if we find that referendum outcomes diverge from the majority preference of non-voters
and the  population  at  large,  we  still  need to  ask ourselves  whether  the  outcome that  would have  been
obtained under a purely representative democracy would have been any different. After all, parliamentary
elections can also be unrepresentative in the sense that turnout in Switzerland is low and skewed (Rosset
2013). Additionally, in most cases the majority of voters tend to follow the government’s recommendation
(Trechsel and Sciarini 1998). To address this question we look at the national parliament’s votes on the
referendum topics. We look for referendums which passed the Ständemehr and where the Bundesrat on the
one hand and the popular majority on the other hand agree but  are ‘defeated’ in the referendum by an
unrepresentative sample of actual voters. We call  such cases  unrepresentative outcomes.  While in theory
differences between the two groups could be driven by both Ständemehr and a mismatch with the national
parliament’s decision the Ständemehr turns out to be inconsequential.10
8 A canton is considered to be voting ‘yes’ if a majority of voters in that canton vote ‘yes’.
9 We provide more background on the Ständemehr in the appendix.
10  See section 3.5 of the appendix for more details.
10
A fair  comparison  of  direct  and  representative  democracy11 requires  us  to  also  look for  cases  where  a
referendum probably led to a more representative outcome than a purely representative democracy. This
means we also need to look for referendums which passed the Ständemehr and where opinion majorities
among voters  and  the full  population  matched.  We call  these  improvements  over  a  hypothetical  policy
outcome under a purely representative democracy representative outcomes.12 
Before we move on to our correlational analyses whether turnout affects representation we provide a brief
descriptive assessment of the representativeness of referendums based on the variables we just described.
The results  of  this  assessment  are  provided in  Figure  5.13 They provide a distribution of  counts  of  our
qualitative indicators across simulated datasets: for each survey we take 1000 random draws from a binomial
probability distribution  with  parameters  (number  of  successes,  i.e.  voters  that  voted  yes,  and  trials,  i.e.
sample sizes) obtained from the survey. This gives us not one but a 1000 estimates of yes-share among non-
11 By which we of course mean the comparison of representative democracy with and without additional institutions of
direct democracy.
12 In total we create six indicators of representation which we summarize in Table 5 in the appendix.
13 In the appendix we repeat the exercise for the group of non-voters only. Obviously the extent of misrepresentation is
greater for non-voters.
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Figure 5: Top row: Distribution of estimated number of mismatches, and unrepresentative outcomes between actual 
referendum outcome and population. Bottom row: Distribution of estimated number of matches, passed matches and 
representative outcomes between actual referendum outcome and population. Comparisons based on 1000 simulated 
survey-based proportions. The median counts are highlighted in gray and means denoted by the vertical dashed lines.
voters and in the population for each referendum.14 We use this approach to deal with random sampling error
which is a necessary component of any survey and of particular relevance in our application. When we
calculate 95% confidence intervals for the yes-shares estimated from the surveys, 54 of these include 50
percent. This means that there is a good chance (at least 5 in a 100) that actual population values are on the
opposite side of 50 percent relative to our estimate. Hence, we may miss-classify some referendums if the
yes-shares estimated from the survey are very close to 50%.
We find on average 11 (7.4%) referendum votes (with the highest density interval being [8, 14]) which did
not match with majority opinion among the population and consequently are classified as mismatches. We
find on average 4.3 [3, 5] of such unrepresentative outcomes. We also investigate whether referendums may
in some cases have improved representation (cf. Figure 6, bottom row). First, the number of  matches by
definition is simply the difference between the number of mismatches and the total number of referendums.
Secondly, we find on average 26.7 [26, 28] representative outcomes – cases where a referendum overturned
the national  parliament’s decision.  An average 4.3  unrepresentative  outcomes versus 26.7  representative
outcomes suggest that on balance referendums have improved representation of the opinion of a majority of
the population.
4 Does higher turnout increase the representativeness of 
referendum outcomes?
This  section  presents  the  results  of  our  analysis  of  the  effects  of  turnout  on  the  representativeness  of
referendum outcomes. We employ two sets of dependent variables: (1) a quantitative indicator, the difference
between  the  actual  and  the  reported  yes  share,  and  (2)  and  mismatches, a  qualitative  indicator  of  the
representativeness of referendum outcomes.15 Consequently, we present two sets of models – the first  is
composed of  OLS regression  models  while  the  latter,  due  to  the  dichotomous  nature  of  the  dependent
variable, comprises binary logistic regression models. The unit of observation is an individual referendum
vote. Because multiple referendums may be held on the same day, some referendums are covered by the
same survey. Hence, referendums held on the same day also share the same turnout. This is why we cluster
standard errors by survey. 
Our key independent variable in both sets of models is the turnout in a referendum. We include the year of
the referendum, the unity of the federal government’s parties on the referendum (support of all 7 federal
governors = 7, support of none of them = 0)16, as well as dummies for the type of referendum (referendum
and initiative as opposed to obligatory referendum as a base category)  and the topic of the referendum
(foreign  and  defense  policy and  immigration  policy,  as  opposed  to  domestic  policy which  is  the  base
category) as control variables. 
14  See Figure 5 in the appendix for an illustration.
15  We do not use passed mismatches as dependent variable because its counts do not differ from mismatches and we do not use 
unrepresentative outcomes because there are two few positive cases.
16 We code this variable based on the parties’ paroles. The Bundesrat consists of seven members of which in our period of study two
were fielded by the Liberals (FDP), Conservatives (CVP) and Social democrats (SP) and one by the populist right party SVP.
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Our data range from the beginning of the 1980s to the end of the 1990s. To make sure that changes in Swiss
politics over this period do not obliterate turnout effects, controlling for the time dimension is important.
Certain topics, further, may draw more voters, for instance because they are controversial, while others may
be uncontroversial and elicit only low turnout. Similarly, obligatory referendums can entail minor changes to
the constitution while initiatives most often are controversial. Hence, we control for the type of referendum
to not wrongly attribute the effect of the type to turnout. When it comes to party unity, following Trechsel
and  Sciarini  (1998),  we  assume  that  the  more  the  federal  government’s  parties  agree  on  their  vote
recommendation for the referendum, the more likely voters are to follow this majority opinion. We expect
greater unity and lower turnout in uncontroversial referendums. Hence, we would underestimate the effect of
turnout if we were to omit party unity. A similar argument applies to the topics, as more controversial topics
(i.e.  immigration)  should  be  associated  with  higher  turnout  and  more  mismatches  between government
policy and popular opinion. 
We first present results for the degree of (mis)representation as dependent variable. Table 1 provides the
results for models with the difference in yes-shares as dependent variable. Turnout is negatively correlated
with the gap in actual and reported yes-shares across all models. This implies that the higher turnout the
more representative the referendum. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of our battery of control
variables (models 2 to 4). Consistently a one-unit increase in turnout is associated with a decrease in the gap
of opinions of a tenth of a percentage point. This translates to a one stand deviation increase in turnout (8%-
points) decreasing the gap in yes-shares by roughly one percentage point, a decrease of 17% over the average
yes-share difference. 
As outlined in section 2 we expected to see this relationship because the population of voters becomes more
similar to the full population as turnout increases. Consequently, we see a stronger convergence between
expressed opinions of voters and the opinion of the population at-large. Research has shown that most Swiss
voters are selective voters while only a few are always or never voters respectively (Sciarini et al. 2016;
Dermont 2016). We suspect that as turnout increases more selective voters are drawn to the polls while
never-voters stay at home and that the latter are more different from regular voters than selective voters.
Hence, non-voters will always be different from voters independent of turnout. Indeed, using only the non-
voters as a comparison for mismatches we find hardly any relationship between turnout and our outcome of
interest.17 
The year of the referendum is also negatively correlated with the differences in yes-shares. The type as well
as the topic of the referendum, however, do not show significant associations with the outcome, neither does
party unity. 
17 See Table 6 in the appendix.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Turnout -0.13* -0.12* -0.12* -0.13* 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Year -0.21* -0.21** -0.21** 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Party unity 0.01 0.14 0.12 
(0.19) (0.25) (0.26) 
Referendum 1.54 1.94 
(1.27) (1.21) 
Initiative 1.35 1.35 
(1.54) (1.59) 




Intercept 11.58*** 421.38* 434.60** 435.35** 
(2.15) (159.30) (146.81) (146.11) 
N 148 148 148 148 
R2 0.038 0.077 0.090 0.115 
AIC 903.54 901.43 903.35 903.20 
BIC 909.54 913.42 921.33 927.18 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 .
Table 0: Results of OLS regressions regressing the difference between actual and reported yes-share
on turnout and controls.
Next we focus on  mismatches.  These mark potentially consequential differences in opinion because vote
choice preferred by a majority differs between the groups. The dependent variable here is a dummy, where 0
indicates no mismatch and 1 indicates a mismatch. As described earlier, we find that out of 148 referendums
in our sample, 22 (15%) referendum votes did not match with majority opinion among non-voters. Our key
independent variable is again turnout. We employ the same controls as before. 
Table 2 displays the results for  mismatches.  Turnout  is again positively correlated with our indicator of
misrepresentation but not significant in any model this time. The year of the referendum has a negative
coefficient, meaning that over time referendums become less likely to be unrepresentative. This correlation,
however, is not significant. Party unity again shows no significant coefficients, neither do type and topic of
referendums (model 3).18 
18 Using only the non-voters as a comparison for mismatches, we again find no relationship between turnout and our outcome of 
interest. See Table 7 in the appendix.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Turnout 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Year -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Party unity 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 
(0.15) (0.18) (0.22) 
Referendum -1.06 -1.55 
(0.80) (0.93) 
Initiative -1.07 -1.03 
(0.98) (1.09) 




Intercept -3.95* 210.16 196.29 187.12 
(1.75) (120.95) (114.04) (112.50) 
N 148 148 148 148 
AIC 90.64 91.59 93.72 92.63 
BIC 96.64 103.57 111.70 116.61 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 .
Table 2: Results of logistic regressions regressing the occurrence of a mismatch on turnout and 
controls. 
Generally, the  results  presented here  are  not  surprising in  light  of  our  descriptive assessment  presented
above. The referendums analyzed here are not highly unrepresentative of the majority opinion in the sample,
and thus there are hardly any correlations of other factors with representativeness. As we expected, higher
turnout  reduces  unrepresentativeness,  if  only  slightly.  Further,  the  representativeness  of  referendums
increases over time. We can only speculate about possible explanations here –one may be more equal turnout
over  time,  especially  between  men  and  women.  Female  suffrage  was  introduced  as  late  as  1971  in
Switzerland, and the gender gap in turnout slowly decreased over the next decades, as Kriesi (2005) has
shown. Assuming that a more gender equal turnout better represents the population’s interests, this effect
could explain the increase in representativeness over time.
As discussed in section 3,  the  ‘Vox’ data comes along with some problematic aspects  for  our  analysis:
overreporting of turnout, bandwagoning and random sampling error. The important question is whether these
features of the data lead to a bias in our estimates. The overreporting of turnout can be countered, if only
imperfectly, by weighting the data. Without weighting, non-voters would be underrepresented and hence the
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extend of misrepresentation underestimated. Consequently, the coefficient estimates on turnout would also be
biased downwards. Since we weight the data this problem should at least be alleviated. Bandwagoning – the
tendency  of  some  respondents  to  indicate  their  agreement  with  the  majority  opinion  leading  to  an
overestimation  of  the  vote  share  of  the  winning  option  –  should  also  result  in  an  underestimation  of
misrepresentation.  This  would  lead  our  coefficient  estimates  on  turnout  to  be  biased  towards  zero.
Bandwagoning generally indicates weak opinions among some respondents. To us, bandwagoning does not
actually imply a misrepresentation of people’s true opinion but it  is simply a function of some people’s
opinion  being  rather  weak.  Random sampling  error,  lastly,  introduces  random noise  to  our  dependent
variables because these are derived from our estimates of popular opinion. Hence, we would again expect an
attenuation bias around the dependent variable. 
This means that if there are problems with the data quality they would rather lead to an attenuation bias in
our turnout estimates. Hence, we believe that the estimates of a turnout effect we present are conservative
estimates  because  our  approach  of  measuring  representation  tends  to  underestimate  the  extent  of
misrepresentation. 
5 Conclusion
Direct democracy allows citizens to reverse decisions made by legislatures and even initiate new laws which
parliaments are unwilling to pass, thereby, as its proponents argue, leading to more representative policies
than would have  been  obtained under  a  purely representative democracy. Referendums  are  regarded as
particularly important in the Swiss context which we study where they allow citizens to overturn the super-
sized governing coalition which makes up the Bundesrat. However, direct democracy also has many critics
who fear that referendums may in fact worsen representation. Given that turnout tends to be skewed towards
citizens of high socio-economic status, critics of direct democracy argue that if participation is low, as is the
case in the average Swiss referendum, referendum outcomes are not representative of the preferences of the
population at large. 
We  tested  this  assertion  using  a  compilation  of  post-referendum  surveys  encompassing  148  national
referendums held in Switzerland between 1981 and 1999. We focus on Switzerland because referendums are
frequently held and there is  great  variation in turnout.  All  national  level  referendums in this period are
covered by surveys which uniquely ask non-voters for their hypothetical vote choice had they participated. 
Comparing  opinion  majorities  in  the  surveys  against  actual  referendum  outcomes  we  show  that
representativeness increases in turnout. Further, we find representativeness to increase over time, which can
potentially be explained by more equal turnout, especially of men and women. Our results confirm critics’
arguments that the representativeness of referendums is a function of turnout. The effect is not very strong,
but we believe our estimates based on the Swiss data to be a conservative estimate of the turnout effect.
Overall, the referendums analyzed here are not highly unrepresentative of the majority opinion in the sample.
A  purely  descriptive  assessment  of  the  representativeness  of  referendums  revealed  4.3  (2.9%)
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unrepresentative  outcomes versus  26.7  representative  outcomes,  suggesting that  on balance referendums
were beneficial rather than detrimental to representation. 
We find only few cases where the outcome would have been more representative even under full turnout vis-
à-vis a counterfactual representative outcome. Thus, our results are in line with research on the turnout effect
in elections which finds that higher turnout would not radically change the outcome of votes. For instance,
Citrin et al. (2003) find that nonvoters are more Democratic than voters in US Senate elections but that the
structure of electoral competition weakens the effect of turnout on results considerably. The general lack of
competitiveness of Senate races implies that there are few cases where higher turnout could have realistically
changed electoral outcomes. Hence, only when referendums are very close may turnout affect the outcome.
In our sample only nine out of 148 referendum results (6 %) are within two percentage points of the ‘tipping
point’ 50 percent. 
Our results can be regarded as a proxy for a referendum outcome under full  turnout – however, caution
should be applied when doing so. As (1997, 4) has pointed out, “nonvoters who are asked their opinions on
policy and partisan preferences in surveys are typically citizens who have not given these questions much
thought, who have not been politically mobilized, and who, in terms of social class, have not developed class
consciousness. It is highly likely that, if they were mobilized to vote, their votes would be quite different
from their responses in opinion polls.” In that regard, it  would be interesting to run a survey prior to a
referendum which asks respondents for their likelihood to participate in the vote and their hypothetical vote
choice if they were to go. 
Another question of course is whether referendums lead to generally 'good' policy outcomes, even when they
are responsive to the will of the majority. Some authors have argued that direct democratic institutions, even
when responsive to the majority opinion, can lead to non-democratic outcomes. As Ferejohn (2008, 193ff.)
claims,  the  quality  of  the  outcome  “depends  on  whether  the  median  voter’s wants  really  reflect  some
attractive  conception  of  the  common interest  […] or  whether,  instead,  they are  ephemeral  reactions  to
emotionally charged events, or are manipulated by special interests for their own purposes.” Testing this
claim empirically is difficult because the characteristics of a ‘good outcome’ have to be defined normatively.
The Swiss case does provide examples of majority-supported referendum outcomes that could be considered
as bad outcomes – for example, the rejection of a new naturalization law facilitating citizenship for second
and third generation immigrants born and raised in Switzerland. Swiss voters rejected such policy proposals
in 1983, 1994, and 2004 (mostly with very small margins). A new proposal was only recently accepted in
February 2017. One could argue that in cases like this the median voters interest was probably driven by
special  interests  rather  than  notions  of  fairness  and  justice.  Generally,  the  tendency  to  have  highly
emotionally charged referendums ending in disputed outcomes has become more common in Switzerland
since the 2000s concurrent with the rise of the populist right Swiss people's party. This makes this question,
although scientifically and politically relevant, less of an issue for our analysis.
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Further research should also focus on referendums beyond Switzerland. What this study does provide is an
alternative way to study the representativeness of referendums, which we believe can fruitfully be applied
not just in Switzerland but elsewhere, too. Kriesi (2005) refers to Switzerland’s system of direct democracy
as the “Swiss laboratory.” It is precisely that with all the usual benefits and drawbacks. The Swiss political
system provides us with a unique setting to study the representativeness of referendums, however it may be
hard to generalize these results to other systems.  Concretely, one may suspect  that because of very low
turnout in national elections direct democracy compares quite favorably in this setting, particularly as turnout
in referendums is usually not much lower. In countries with larger differences in turnout we may find even
stronger turnout effects. 
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